

GENDER, ELECTION, AND WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION: ANALYSIS OF THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION

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Abstract

The result of the 2019 Indonesian General Election (i.e., presidential and national parliament) highlighted women's increasing representation at the national level (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/House of Representatives) and the provincial level (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi/DPRD *Provinsi*, or Provincial Legislature; and DPRD *Kabupaten/Kota*, or District/Municipality Legislature). A quota of 30% women in parliament was adopted but not attained: women's parliamentary representation in Indonesia at the national level has reached the average number for East Asia and Pacific Countries, namely, 20% in 2018 (IPU, 2019).

However, women's representation in parliament is based on gender representation and **substantive representation**, in which women MPs can introduce transformative political notions (politics of difference) and new policy priorities, proposals, and public policy benefits for women and other minority and marginalized groups. In this article, I argued that the increasing statistical representation of women has no correlation with and does not guarantee the outcome of pro-women policies or policies in favor of other marginalized and minority groups.

I propose that the statistical representation (descriptive representation) has no linkages with **substantive representation**. Issues related to the meaning of representation, political parties' nomination of women and internal democracy, as well as patronage, dynasty politics, and oligarchy lead to the entrapment of a higher number of women MPs into a shallow symbolic representation, debilitating the progress to achieve substantive representation after the four election cycles since 2004. Ironically, the elected women MPs tend to perpetuate and reproduce the traditionally masculine brand of politics rather than transform unequal gender relations.

Key words: *election, quota, women's representation*

Introduction

In post-1998 Reformation Indonesia, women's participation in the public arena and formal politics is less constrained than in the prior era. **Wide-open access** for women to participate and contest in elections has been observed at all levels of government, from the village to the national level, and this achievement is encouraging.

The number of women in public positions has been increasing annually. Therefore, I propose that the phenomenon of increase in women's participation in Indonesia's democratic space is due to the 1998 Reformation. This increase in women participating and entering formal politics is helping preserve democracy. Politics is no longer an arena denied to women. Today, women participate as equals with men in politics.

Notable progress is also evident in the more equitable **regulations** for women's participation in politics and those for the public, who have ceased their antagonistic stance against women participating in politics. However, despite this progress, a critical view of this novel situation is necessary.

The number of women in the Indonesian Parliament (i.e., Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of Representatives [DPR]) is increasing

The percent and number of women in the Indonesian Parliament (i.e., the national level), according to the 2019 General Election (i.e., presidential and national parliamentary) result, is 20.52% and 118 of 575 total members, respectively. This number is the highest in Indonesian history, since the first election in 1955. According to a 2020 global gender gap index, of 153 countries, Indonesia ranks 85th, with a score of 0.700 (0 = imparity, 1 = parity), which is a satisfactory score. This percentage is below the global average for women's representation in parliament, which is 25%. However, Indonesian women's parliamentary representation at the national level has attained the average for East Asia and Pacific Countries, which was 20% in 2018 (IPU, 2019)

Women's political empowerment and representation in the Indonesian Parliament requires further efforts to close the gender gap and advance from "descriptive representation" to "substantive representation." Notably, the quality of representation has been declining. Campaigns for highly competitive elections are expensive, and most women candidates cannot afford this cost. This situation increases patronage politics

and direct vote buying. The power of capital and practices of oligarchic politics are a barrier that excludes capable, independent women candidates. A stereotype in Indonesia is that that women lack capacity. This stereotype may decrease the amount of money donated to women candidates, perpetuating practices of oligarchic politics, for example, “buying” the candidates by financing their campaigns.

The phenomenon of women engaging in **transactional politics and oligarchy** and their weak bargaining position have resulted in their not implementing transformative politics (politics of difference), for example, introducing policy priorities, proposals, and public policies that benefit women and other minority and marginalized groups.

In this paper, I distinguish between the terms “sex” and “gender.” The term “sex” denotes the biological differences between women and men; the term “gender” denotes the social constructs of those distinctions. The concept of gender politics allows analytical distance from the biological/sexual politics that treats men and women as binary oppositions in political practices.

The term “politics” is often used by political scientists to refer to the formal processes and institutions of the government and elections. The feminist movement added two meanings of politics to the traditional male-centered, majority-centered definition: politics for women should encompass informal politics and the dynamics of everyday life—“The personal is political” (Okin, 1979; Squires, 1999), and politics is “power relations that permeate all levels of social life, including relations within the private sphere of home and family” (Butler, 1990). In this paper, I define gender politics as the concept of power relations shaping elections and gender that is continuously constructed and redefined in specific political contexts.

In this paper, I critically analyze the increase in women’s representation in Indonesian legislative bodies after the 2019 General Election. I argue that the increasing number of women in national parliament has no correlation with and does not guarantee the outcome of pro-women policies or policies in favor of other marginalized and minority groups.

I argue that descriptive/statistical representation has no linkages with substantive representation. Issues related to the meaning of gender representation, political party

nominations, and internal democracy, as well as patronage/dynasty politics/oligarchy, lead to the entrapment of a higher number of women MPs into shallow symbolic representation, debilitating the progress to achieve substantive representation after the four election cycles since 2004. Women MPs ironically perpetuate and reproduce masculine politics rather than transform unequal gender relations.

Theoretical framework

The literature on **women, gender, elections** can be categorized into research on electing women and women being elected. In this paper, I focus on **how women are elected to political office**, namely, to the national parliament. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) analyzed the supply and demand model of political recruitment. They proposed that the number of women elected is a combined result of the **qualification** of women as a group to run for political office, namely, their **resources** and **motivation**, and the desire or willingness within the elite's perception of women's **abilities and experience**.

In addition to the literature on why women are underrepresented in national parliaments, there is a large body of literature that uses the type of electoral system to explain the structural and contextual factors that shape women's access to parliament. This type of analysis raises an argument that the percentage of women elected tends to be higher in countries with a **proportional representation electoral system** than in countries with majoritarian electoral arrangements (Salmon, 2006). A proportional representation system tends to be organized around multimember districts, in which there is more than one person elected that makes way for women to be included within the total seats available in each district.

The dramatic increase and shift in women's representation have increased the amount of literature on the adoption of the policy of **gender quotas** as a “fast track” to increase women's representation in the Indonesian Parliament (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009). Some perspectives recognize that women's participation and representation add values essential for a democracy. Other perspectives are deeper than the explanation of the “politics of presence” of women in political institutions.

This growing body of literature has addressed the degree to which women in political

office translates into advancing women's issues in policy making, that is, the relationship between the “descriptive” and “substantive” representation of women (Pitkin, 1967). Political theories have presented various arguments on women's interests and perspectives as means to support the efforts of increasing women's political representation (Philips, 1995; Young, 2000). However, the notion of women's interests remains controversial (Molyneux, 1985). As a result, scholars have identified women's issues by using various methods.

In the first section of this article, I present the Indonesian political background post-1998 Reformation. The drastic shift to democracy, with political parties and electoral reforms, was the political context of how the discussion on women's political representation in Indonesia gained political momentum. To explain the narrative of women's political representation in Indonesia, I apply the logic I observed in Norris and Lovenduski (1995), Dahlerup (2006), Ann Philips (1995), and Irish M Young (2000).

In the second section, I present the result of the 2019 General Election on the basis of the political database of Cakra Wikara Indonesia (CWI), an Indonesian nonprofit and nonpartisan policy research, as well as data collected from the Center for Political Studies at the University of Indonesia (Puskapol UI). Next, I present a critical analysis of the statistical data from CWI and Puskapol UI, focusing on the gender dimension of women's nomination by political parties, the background of women elected to office, and the gender quota in the Indonesian electoral system.

In the last section, I highlight findings from the second section and develop a deeper analysis than in the second section on the meaning of women's representation in the Indonesian Parliament, namely, the connection between “descriptive” and “substantive” representation. **I draw conclusions by** examining elected women MPs' background, which is highly dominated by dynasty politics and the professional/business sector, and the quotas that undermine women MPs' ability to be independent of the party that nominates them. The large sum of money required for campaigns to win elections entraps women candidates and officials into serving the interests of the sponsors of their campaign, rather than enabling these women to act responsively to their constituents as elected MPs.

I. Country Political Background

Indonesia is the world's third-largest democracy. The authoritarian regime under General Suharto that dominated the country for more than 30 years was overthrown in 1998. Today, the political system is a presidential system. The president, as chief of state and head of government, is elected in a general election held every five years.

The last presidential election was held in 2019, in which President Joko Widodo was reelected with 60.8% of the vote. The cleric Kyai Ma'ruf Amin succeeded Jusuf Kala as vice president in Jokowi's second term.

The Indonesian Constitution, *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (1945 Constitution), guarantees fair participation for all citizens in politics. Article 27 subsection 1 states that every citizen is equal before the law and government and is obliged to respect the law indiscriminately.

Indonesia's political system is the outcome of several Constitutional Amendments passed after Suharto was overthrown. Since 1998, the Constitution has been amended four times (1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002). In 1999, the First Amendment regulated the limitation of the president and vice president serving two terms. In 2000, the Second Amendment added refined articles on human rights and a regulation to broaden regional autonomy. In 2001, the Third Amendment concerned a direct presidential election by the people; subsequently, it regulated that the legislative institution would be a two-chamber system—DPR and Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD)—and formed the National Permanent and the Independent General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU). In 2002, the Fourth Amendment added a regulation on the judicial institution, restructuring by forming new institutions: the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK) and Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial/KY).

Party and the electoral system in Indonesia post-Reformation

Reform and democratization in Indonesia have resulted in many renewals in political party institutions. Political openness has eliminated the limitations on and control of political parties that were imposed by the authoritarian Suharto regime. The establishment

of new parties no longer experiences oppression. Reforms of the party system during the Reformation Era were aimed at strengthening party institutionalization, promoting the simplification of the party establishment, and establishing national-scale parties.

Reforms of laws regulating political parties were conducted. The first reform was conducted by passing Law No.2/1999 on political parties; this reform was revised and became Law No.31/2002; the latest revision was Law No.2/2008. Forty-eight political parties participated in the 1999 General Election. In the 2004 General Election, 24 parties participated, and in the 2009 election, 38 national parties and six local parties participated in Aceh. In the 2014 election, 12 national parties and three local parties participated in Aceh. The latest election had 14 national parties and four local parties participating in Aceh.

The Post-Reform Electoral System in Indonesia demonstrates that the combination of proportional and majoritarian systems has been adopted by Indonesia since 1999. The adoption of the combination system was implemented in the 2004 General Election and the 2005 Regional Election (*Pilkada serentak*). The shift from a closed list system, implemented by only choosing the party's symbol in 1999, to a proportional semi-open list representation, implemented by choosing the party and candidate in 2004, was combined with direct presidential, regional head, and regional representative (DPD) elections, featured on SNTV on 2004. Since 2009 and Constitutional Court Decision no 22-24/PUU-VI/2008, Indonesia has implemented **a proportional open list system for parliamentary (DPR/DPRD) elections.**

The evidence of the shift in election law since Reformation is Law No.3/1999 on elections and Law **No.12/2003**, Law No.10/2008, Law No.8/2012, and Law No.7/2017 on the election of parliament members.

Women's political representation

Holding direct elections for the legislative and executive branches represented a signature reform away from authoritarianism. Women's political representation since then has been on the political agenda as an aspect of the democratic reshaping of Indonesia. Under Suharto's authoritarian regime, the portion of seats in the national parliament at the sub-

national level was smaller than women's representation in the population. Activists had argued for greater women's political representation as a core pillar of democratic reform. The political momentum of *Reformasi* in Indonesia that promoted the reform of political parties and the adoption of a proportional representation system in the legislature and an electoral system is considered favorable to electing women candidates to parliament.

Activist and feminist movements in the heyday of *Reformasi* also argued for the need to “jump start” women's parliamentary representation by adopting a women's quota. This affirmative strategy was supported by UN Law No 12/2003 on the election of parliament members. Parts of this law encourage parties to “consider” aiming for at least 30% women on the party lists of candidates for multimember electoral districts and at national and provincial levels.

The provision on women candidacy through an affirmative mechanism is stipulated in Article 65 Subsection 1:

Political parties participating in election may propose their candidate for national parliament/ provincial parliament/regency and city parliament, while considering women's representation for at least 30%.

In the 2004 election, after suggesting the quota of 30%, women's representation increased from 9% (1999) to 11.8% (2004) at the national level. The result was disappointing, particularly for women activists who had been actively lobbying to have the quota adopted. At first, the political climate was hostile toward the suggested quota because it was considered “un-democratic.” The law stipulated no sanctions against noncompliant parties. In addition, women were often placed in unwinnable positions at the bottom of party lists. This policy failure, merely suggesting rather than mandating a quota, led to further lobbying for a strengthened quota. A coalition of nongovernmental organizations drafted a clause subsequently included in the 2008 Law on Election (Law No. 10/2008), which obligated parties to include on their party lists a minimum of 30% women candidates and at least one women in the top three candidates (semi-zipper system); in Article 53 Law No. 10/2008, the following is stated: “The list of candidates as referred to in article 52 shall contain at least 30% of women's representation.” In Article 55 Law No. 10/2008, the following is stated: “In the list of the candidate as referred to in subsection 1, in every 3 persons there shall be at least one woman candidate.”

In September 2008, Law No. 10/2008, containing regulations on the zipper system and quota policy, was appealed by two candidates for the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi). They argued that the regulations were antithetical to the principle of equality. Judges dismissed the case on the grounds that the state was obliged to promote substantive equality. However, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner on another ground: they decided on an open list system such that parties would lose their power to direct the votes to candidates placed on the top of the party lists (Detik.com, 2008). The candidates elected would be the women or men who received the most votes.

Court Decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008 ruled that candidates had to campaign as individuals rather than as party blocs so that the position on the party lists became less relevant in gaining a seat. This competition then encouraged the rise in patronage and direct vote buying, practices considered barriers to capable, independent women candidates.

The political climate increased in favorability in 2009 because all major parties supported the idea of increasing the number of women in parliament. *Potret Keterpilihan Perempuan di Legislatif pada Pemilu 2009* (Puskapol UI, 2013) states that six of the 38 parties participating in the 2009 election did not fulfill the quota, and five parties placed women in one of the top three positions, as required by the law. However, overall, 34.7% of candidates for the national legislature were women, resulting in an increase in women's representation to 17.6%, close to the world average of 19%.

During the 2014 election campaign, the KPU increased its enforcement of the quota. Election Commission Regulation (PKPU) No.7/2013 enforces the obligation of political parties participating in an election to nominate 30% women as candidates in every electoral district and to have one woman candidate in every three persons. Any party that did not fulfill this requirement in any district would be disqualified from competing in the said district. During the 2014 election campaign, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (KPPA) enacted media campaigns encouraging voters to elect women candidates. Data from the book *Potret Keterpilihan Anggota Legislatif Hasil Pemilu 2014* (Puskapol UI, 2015) demonstrates that the proportion of women candidates increased to 37%, and women won 17.3% seats in 2014 in the national parliament, less than the number of seats in 2009.

The law on elections was again revised to Law No.7/2017. The regulation on the affirmative policy for women in elections is the same as that in the prior law (No.8/2012). To enforce the regulation, the KPU and the PKPU oblige every political party in the election to nominate at least 30% women as candidates in every electoral district. In its placement, parties must obey the regulation that states the following: “Of every 3 persons there shall be at least one woman candidate.” The Decision Letter of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (*SK Menkumham*) further obliged political parties to have 30% of women on their political board. In 2019, the number of women in the national parliament was 20.52%, the highest number in the history of Indonesia.

Table 1
Women’s representation

Political party	2009			2014			2019		
	Total seat	Women seat	%	Total seat	Women seat	%	Total seat	Women seat	%
PKB	28	7	25,00	47	10	21,28	58	12	20,69
Gerindra	26	5	19,23	73	11	15,07	78	12	15,38
PDIP	94	17	18,09	109	21	19,27	128	26	20,31
Golkar	106	18	16,98	91	16	17,58	85	19	22,35
Nasdem	0	0	0	35	4	11,43	59	19	32,20
PKS	57	3	5,26	40	1	2,50	50	8	16,00
PPP	38	5	13,16	39	10	25,64	19	5	26,32
PAN	46	7	15,22	49	9	18,37	44	7	15,91
Demokrat	148	35	23,65	61	13	21,31	54	10	18,52
Hanura	17	3	17,65	16	2	12,50	0	0	0
Total	550	100	17,86	560	97	17,32	575	118	20,52

Source: CWI.Dataspasial.id

In 2001, in the Third Constitutional Amendment, the Indonesian Legislative Institution adopted a two-chamber system comprising the DPR and the DPD. The DPD Election does not implement a gender quota, and women have been strongly represented in the DPR: 26.5% in 2009 and 25.8% in 2014. In 2019 (Table 2), the percent of women in the DPD increased to 30.88%. This percent fulfilled the quota and was celebrated. The relative success of women candidates is attributed to the lack of involvement of political

parties in the nomination of candidates. Candidates are judged on an individual basis, and success is linked to the candidates' individual political network and community work.

Table 2
Women's representation in the Regional Representative Council

Period	Number of Province	Total	Male	Percentage	Female	Percentage
2004-2009	32	128	101	79 %	27	21 %
2009-2014	33	132	97	73,5%	35	26,5 %
2014-2019	33	132	98	74,25 %	34	25,75%
2019 -2024	34	136	94	69,22 %	42	30,88 %

Source CWI. dataspasial.id

Women's representation in Provincial and District Parliament

The decentralization stipulated in the Second Amendment in 2000 intended to decrease the distance between the individuals in power and their constituents. The local parliament (provincial and district/municipality) comprises directly elected representatives in multimember electorates subject to the candidate quota in the election law. In 2009, women were elected to an average of 16% of the seats in 33 provincial parliaments and 12% in district parliaments; these percentages are lower than that of the national parliament (Puskapol UI, 2013). In 2014, the proportion of women members in the provincial parliament was 14.6% of the seats in 33 provincial parliaments and 14.2% in 403 district parliaments (Puskapol UI, 2015). The number of women elected was diverse across Indonesia, for example, in Papua Barat, one woman (2%) was elected, and in North Sulawesi, of the seats in the local parliaments, 30% belonged to women.

The data presented in Table 3 depicts the result of the 2019 election. The percent of women’s representation at the provincial level is 18.01%. In some provinces, such as Central Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, women have more than 30% representation in provincial parliaments; in other provinces, such as West Sumatra, Bangka Belitung, and West Nusa Tenggara, women have less than 5% representation in provincial parliaments.

Several analysts have identified that the contestation at the local level in the period of democratization is linked to the local, old culture (customary institutions, conservative religious values), which in some cases has invoked social constructs of gender that strengthen male privilege and exclude women from politics (Robinson, 2018). Such an argument explains women’s low representation in some districts/municipalities. Other reasons for women’s low representation at the local level are socioeconomic conditions. An analysis of the correlation between the Human Development Index and women’s electability in the Indonesian Parliament found the following: areas with a high representation of women, such as DKI Jakarta, Lampung, and North Sulawesi, are examples of provinces with the highest HDI rank in Indonesia; provinces with a consistently low representation of women (less than 10%), such as Aceh, West Sumatra, Bali, NTB, and NTT are examples of provinces with a low rank in GDI and GEM. (Puskapol UI, 2015).

Table 3
Women’s representation in Provincial Parliaments on 2019

No	Province	Men	Women	Total seat	% women
1	Aceh	72	9	81	11.11
2	North Sumatra	87	13	100	13.00
3	West Sumatra	62	3	65	4.62
4	Riau	53	12	65	18.45
5	Jambi	47	8	55	14.55
6	South Sumatra	57	18	75	24.00
7	Bangka Belitung Islands	43	2	45	4.44
8	Bengkulu	38	7	45	15.56
9	Lampung	66	19	85	22.35

10	Riau Islands	40	5	45	11.11
11	Jakarta	83	23	106	21.70
12	West Java	96	24	120	20.00
13	Central Java	94	26	120	21.67
14	East Java	99	21	120	17.50
15	Jogjakarta	45	10	55	18.18
16	Banten	71	14	85	16.47
17	Bali	47	8	55	14.55
18	West Nusa Tenggara	64	1	65	1.54
19	East Nusa Tenggara	54	11	65	16.92
20	West Kalimantan	56	9	65	13.85
21	Central Kalimantan	29	16	45	35.56
22	South Kalimantan	44	11	55	20.00
23	East Kalimantan	44	11	55	20.00
24	North Kalimantan	31	4	35	11.43
25	North Sulawesi	32	13	45	28.89
26	Central Sulawesi	33	12	45	26.67
27	South Sulawesi	59	26	85	30.59
28	West Sulawesi	40	5	45	11.11
29	Southeast Sulawesi	38	7	45	15.56
30	Gorontalo	33	12	45	26.67
31	Maluku	34	11	45	24.44
32	North Maluku	33	12	45	26.67
33	Papua	47	8	55	14.55
34	West Papua	38	7	45	15.56
	Total	1809	398	2207	18.03

Source CWI.dataspasial.id

II. Result of the 2019 Legislative Election

On May 21, 2019, the KPU announced the final result of the 2019 Legislative Election (Kompas.com, 2019). Of the 16 political parties that participated in the election, nine

passed the parliamentary threshold of 4% and gained seats in national parliaments. Those nine parties are the (1) Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/PDIP) - 19.33%; (2) Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya/Gerindra) - 12.57%; (3) Golongan Karya/Golkar - 12.31%; (4) The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) - 9.69%; (5) National Democrat Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat/Nasdem) - 9.05%; (6) Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) - 8.21%; (7) Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat) - 7.77%; (8) National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) - 6.84%; and (9) United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP) - 4.5%.

The four new parties (Garuda, Berkarya, Partai Persatuan Indonesia/Perindo, and Partai Solidaritas Indonesia [PSI]) debuted in the legislative race but did not pass the parliamentary threshold. As had been generally predicted by analysts, the new parties had difficulty passing the parliamentary threshold of 4% or obtaining at least 5 million votes.

Data in Table 4 demonstrate that the political parties that did not pass the parliamentary threshold had the highest numbers of women candidates: Indonesia Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia/PKPI) with 55%, the Garuda Party with 48%, and the PSI with 48%; the strongest winner, the PDIP, Golongan Karya (Golka), and Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) had the fewest women candidates. This finding illustrates the questionable commitment of big parties to nominate women as strong candidates.

Table 4
Nomination of Women Candidates in the 2019 election based on Political Parties

No	Political Parties	Women Candidates	Total Candidates	% Women
1.	PKPI	77	140	55
2.	Garuda	109	226	48
3.	PSI	274	574	48
4.	PPP	233	554	42
5.	Hanura	180	428	42
6.	PKS	212	531	40
7.	Demokrat	226	573	39,4
8.	Perindo	220	569	39
9.	PAN	223	575	39
10.	Nasdem	222	575	38,6
11.	Berkarya	214	554	38,6
12.	PKB	220	575	38,3
13.	Golkar	216	575	38
14.	PDIP	215	573	37,52
15.	PBB	177	482	37
16.	Gerindra	212	575	36,87

Source: CWI.Dataspasial.id

I compared the number of women's nominations in the 2019 election with those of the 2009 and 2014 elections (Table 5), and the number of women candidates has been increasing for three election cycles. Notably, electoral votes for women also increased in the three election cycles. It is a positive sign that the public was neither hostile nor against women in politics and willing to vote for women candidates.

Data in Table 5 demonstrate that the number of women candidates and vote acquisition increased. However, the gap between women's vote acquisition and seats obtained is notable. The percentage of women's seats in the national legislature is lower than the percentage of their vote share. There are several explanations for the cause of the gap. The nomination of a higher percentage of women candidates did not necessarily translate into more seats for women. Evidently, what appears to matter most was not the overall

number of women nominated by parties but the position of women candidates on the ballot. Most women candidates were not placed in winnable positions on the list, namely, in the top spots of the ballot and/or in districts of party strongholds. Another reason for the gap was the implementation of the parliamentary threshold of 4% that led to the loss of votes. Parties such as PKPI, Garuda, and PSI had more than 45% women candidates but were eliminated from the race for not passing the 4% parliamentary threshold.

Table 5
Number of women candidates, women’s vote share, and seat allocation

	Election 2009	Election 2014	Election 2019
Women nomination as legislative candidates	33%	37 %	39,98 %
Electoral votes for women	22%	23%	24,01 %
Seat allocation for women	18 %	17 %	20,52 %

Source: CWI.dataspasial.id

The statistical data of women’s political representation in the 2019 National and Local Election (provincial and regency/city representatives) is presented in Table 6. In the past two elections (2009, 2014), at the national level, women’s representation in the DPR was 17.86% in 2009, 17.32% in 2014, and 20.52% in 2019. At the provincial level, women’s representation was 16% in 2009, 14% in 2014, and 18% in 2019. At the regency/municipality level, women’s representation was 12% in 2009, 14% in 2014, and 15% in 2019.

Table 6
**Women’s seats in the House of Representatives, Provincial Representative,
 Regency/City Representative in the 2019 election**

Parliament	Women’s representation	Total Seats
House of Representatives	20.52%	575
Provincial Representatives	18.03%	2,207
Regency/City Representatives	15.25%	16,975

*Data of 11 Regency/City Representatives are not available
 CWI.dataspasial.id

Source:

Women Candidates on the party list and the Zipper System

After Constitutional Court Decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008, the rank of candidates on party lists was less relevant in gaining seats; parliamentary seats were now gained by receiving the most votes. This decision had substantial implications for the gender quota and zipper system in the election law. Before the Court Decision, a seat was gained based on the position/rank of the candidates on the party list. Women were often ranked in unwinnable positions at the bottom of party lists, undermining their probability of being elected, such that it was close to zero. Therefore, the zipper system was designed to prevent political parties from placing women candidates at the bottom of party lists.

The quota and zipper system mandated that political parties have a minimum of 30% women candidates on their lists and at least one woman in the top three candidates. Thus, the gender quota and zipper system, regarding proportional representation in the electoral system, enhanced the likelihood that women would be elected, specifically when ranked 1–3 on the party list. Although the rank of candidates on the party list is decreasing in relevance, most of the women elected as MPs (nearly 50%) were candidates ranked number 1 on the party list. Data in Table 7 demonstrate that most of the women

elected to the DPR (85.48%) were candidates ranked number 1–3 on the party list. Nearly 50% (48.72%) of the women elected were ranked first on the candidate list. No women candidates ranked seventh or lower were elected to the DPR.

The importance of ballot position has led to intense competition among candidates within political parties. Each Indonesian political party has a mechanism for allocating ballot positions. Some parties allow party boards, dominated by men, to decide. Other parties prefer parliamentary incumbents when considering ranks for candidates, reinforcing the existing gender imbalance. Political parties also often place their strongest candidates higher on the ballots, which I observed in several electoral districts. (Perdana & Hilman, 2020). Widespread practices of selling ballot positions to the highest bidder further disadvantage women, who already have less access than men to funding and connections that may facilitate such transactions (Amalia, 2019; Hillman, 2018).

Table 7
Number of Women Elected to the House of Representatives on the Basis of Candidacy Number

Candidacy Number	Number of Women Candidates	Percentage
1	57	48.72
2	29	24.79
3	14	11.97
4	5	4.27
5	5	4.27
6	6	5.13
7	1	0.85
8	0	0
9	0	0
10	0	0
Total	117	100

Source: CWI.dataspasial.id

Background of women elected to parliament

Women candidates made significant gains in the 2019 General Election, securing 20.52% of the seats in the DPR and 30% in the DPD.

The introduction of the open list voting system in Indonesia further emphasized candidates' campaign and their capabilities to raise funds, increasing the pressure on women candidates disadvantaged by having less access than men to the clientelistic network that influences candidate selection, positions on the party list, and the resources necessary to engage in the common practice of vote buying (Perdana, 2019). Unsurprisingly, an increasing number of elected women are relatives of male politicians or dynastic figures with access to campaign funding (Puskapol UI, 2019).

The background of elected women in the DPR in 2019 is presented in Chart 1: 53% were professionals, 41% had familial ties to political elites, and 6% were party activists (Puskapol UI, 2019). In the local parliaments, the backgrounds of women representatives were similar to those at the national level.




Chart 1

Background of the women MPs with political connections who received the most votes

Table 8
10 Women in the National Parliament who received the most votes

No	Name	Rank in the ballot	Electoral district	Party	Total votes	Background
1	Puan Maharani	1	Central Java 5	PDIP	404,034	Daughter of former president Megawati (Political Connection - Dynasty Politics)
2	Adriana Dondokambey	1	North Sulawesi	PDIP	213,224	Wife of Governor North Sulawesi (Political Connection - Dynasty Politics)
3	Eva Juliana	1	Central Java 5	Nasdem	189,376	Professional
4	Esti Wijayati	3	Jogjakarta	PDIP	176,306	Party Activist
5	Rieke Diah Pitaloka	1	West Java 7	PDIP	169,729	Public Figure (Professional)
6	Lestari Moendiyat	1	Central Java 2	Nasdem	165,009	Businesswoman (Professional)
7	Sri wahyuni	5	East Java 7	Nasdem	161,102	Wife of Ponorogo Head District, East Java (Political Connection - Dynasty Politics)
8	Teti Rohatiningsih	2	Central Java 8	Golkar	147,905	Wife of Mayor of Cilacap, West Java (Political Connection - Dynasty Politics)

9	Rachel Maryam	1	West Java 2	Gerindra	145,636	Public Figure (Professional)
10	Puti Guntur Sukarno	2	East Java 2	PDIP	139,794	Granddaughter of former president Sukarno (Political Connection - Dynasty Politics)

Source: Puskapol, 2019.

The turnover in the 2019 election is notable. The turnover rate has been consistently higher for women than for men (Puskapol UI, 2019). The turnover rate for women in parliament increased from 60% to 67% in 2019, and the rate for men decreased from 56% to 49%. Men and women candidates who have served only one term in parliament struggle to gain experience and act as effective lawmakers, specifically MPs whose prior career track had less exposure to politics. The high turnover rate increases the difficulty for women MPs to gain a foothold in parliament.

III. Discussion

Political representation

Hana Pitkin (1967) identified four types of political representation: (1) *authorized*, in which a representative is legally empowered to act for another; (2) *descriptive*, in which the representative stands for a group by sharing similar characteristics such as race, gender, ethnicity, or residence; (3) *symbolic*, in which a leader stands for national ideas; and (4) *substantive*, in which the representative aims to advance a group's policy preferences and interests.

On the basis of Pitkin's categorization of types of political representations, the legal gender quota has achieved its aim to increase women's statistical representation, aligning with Pitkin's explanation of descriptive representation. **Descriptive representation** is when a legislative assembly is said to be representative of its

constituents, formulating a miniaturized model or a microcosm of society. Women are equal citizens; therefore, men and women should have equal power in public decision making.

In an influential formulation, Ann Philips (1995) described four possible reasons for increasing women's representation: (1) provide role models; (2) promote justice; (3) articulate interest; and (4) improve democracy because the participation of women will introduce different values and concerns into political debates. Drude Dahlerup (2006), in her well-known study of Scandinavia, examined six areas in which increased women's representation might significantly affect political life: (1) the decline of sexual harassment, (2) the performance and efficiency of women politicians, (3) a more consensual style and family-friendly working arrangements, (4) political discourse and the redefinition of "political concern," (5) the feminization of political agendas, and (6) the broader social and economic empowerment of women.

Suzanne Dovi (2008) criticized the normative arguments for women's representation by asking whether the mere presence of "any" women would do. A focus on sex may obscure that a woman is also constituted by her other identities. Dovi argued that a substantive representation requires "preferable group representatives." In line with Dovi's arguments, Irish Marion Young (2000) asserted further that women of underrepresented social groups should be present in political institutions to facilitate these groups' representation because their position in society creates a shared social perspective among group members. Jane Mansbridge (1999), however, remained cautious regarding the arguments about "women" as a group because of the risk of promoting essentialism or the notion that members of certain groups have an essential identity that all members of the group share. Learning from the ideas of feminist thinkers, such as Ann Philips, Irish Young, and Suzanne Dovi, and experiences in Scandinavia, the nation with the highest women's representation in politics, would benefit Indonesian women activists' lobbying of the parliament on the gender quota.

The link between descriptive and substantive representation, according to Laurel Weldon (2002), relies on the understanding of the essence of women's representation and its importance that aims for actual substantive representation, as well as the relationship between individual experiences and group perspectives. She concluded that "substantive representation of women needs integral collaboration with women

movements and women's focal points in the policy agency and institution, rather only depending on the mere presence of women in parliament" (Weldon, 2002).

Considering Weldon's argument, the statistical increase in women's representation in the Indonesian Parliament has no correlation with and does not guarantee the outcome of pro-woman policies or policies in favor of other marginalized and minority groups. The DPR in 2014–2019 did not pass crucial women's rights legislation such as a bill to eradicate sexual harassment, a revision of the criminal code, a gender-equality and justice bill, a domestic workers rights bill, and other bills that favor women and other marginalized groups. The local legislature has not progressed in securing and advocating policies to protect women and marginalized individuals despite the increase in women's representation in several regions. Notably, the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) reported that 154 discriminative policies are harmful to women, including poor and marginalized women, and other minority groups, including religious and sexual minorities. These policies directly discriminate against women in terms of the politicization of women's bodies and restrictions on freedom of expression (policing women's clothes), criminalization against women (eradication of prostitution), impoverishment, and degradation/removal/neglect of rights of protection and legal certainty. Other policies restrict religious freedom and discriminate against gender minorities. (Komnas Perempuan, 2010).

Advocacy for public policies in favor of women and other marginalized groups remains a critical gap between the movement of electoral and nonelectoral politics. Grassroot movements fighting for women's rights, indigenous peoples' rights, domestic workers' rights, the environment, and people with disabilities in Indonesia are much more progressive than the progress in electoral politics.

Problems of political parties

The analysis of the result of the 2019 election illustrates the consequential influence of political parties in selecting and promoting a minimum of 30% women candidates. The capacity of different political parties to secure seats for their women candidates eminently varies, and the structures of political parties are substantial obstacles for women's candidacy and the promotion of women's issues. The success rate by party of women candidates also fluctuates with each election. During the last two elections (2014

and 2019), the PPP was the only party successful in consistently securing a high number of seats for women candidates. The PKS also increased its percentage of women MPs, from 2.5% in 2014 to 16% in 2019 (Table 1).

Nasdem has been the only political party to achieve the quota (i.e., 30% seats for their women candidates). Unlike the parties that ask their prospective women candidates to compete for positions and votes without access to the parties' resources, Nasdem developed a four-pillar strategy to support its women candidates. First, the party commission conducts a survey to assess the potential and electability of the women candidates across the electoral district. This step eases the need for candidates to self-fund polling and surveys. Second, Nasdem declared that candidates would not pay fees to run for office under their flag. Third, Nasdem provided a degree of logistic support for its women candidates, including campaign tool kits (a banner and name cards). Fourth, Nasdem offers financial subsidies for candidates who receive at least 100,000 votes in their electoral district (Perdana, 2019).

The PSI has implemented a similar system. As a new party, the PSI nominated 48% women candidates in the election. The PSI claimed to be a political party for millennials and targeted women, youth, and interfaith groups. The PSI was eliminated from parliament because it did not pass the 4% parliamentary threshold. Regarding the more established parties, such as the PDIP, Golkar, and Gerindra, they have consistently nominated fewer women candidates than the other parties have in the past two elections. The parliamentary threshold in the last election seemed to negatively affect the increase in women's political representation because it eliminated political parties with the highest percentage of women candidates, such as the PKPI, Garuda, and PSI (Table 4).

Ikasarana & Novitasari (2019) also highlighted women's representation in internal party structures. Nearly half of the women candidates listed as number 1 or 2 in larger parties such as the Democratic Party, Gerindra, and the PPP concurrently hold positions in the party structure. More women in strategic positions in the structure could increase the probability of more women at the top of the list. Notably, only 11 women in the political parties in Indonesia have gained such strategic positions or are currently in positions.

Patronage, dynasty politics, and oligarchy

The domination of dynasty politics in Indonesian elections is not a new phenomenon. Similar practices were observed in the authoritarian Suharto regime. The difference in the dynasty politics in the New Order (Suharto's regime) era and Reformation Era is which groups hold the highest concentration of power: in the New Order era, a small group of people close to Suharto held the highest concentration of power, and in the Reformation Era (i.e., contemporary Indonesia), this concentration of power is expanded to the lowest level—adults with political connections at any level have greater chance to enter the politics. The practices of dynasty politics pose a substantial problem to the poor regeneration process of political parties. Dynasty politics occupying the spaces and positions in political parties causes the low number of new, potential, and capable candidates to be nominated in elections.

Well-known MPs (Table 8), such as Puan Maharani, Puti Guntur, Teti Rohatiningsih, Adriana Dondokambey, and Sri Wahyuni, are linked to dynasty politics. A similar phenomenon is also found in politics at the local level. Nominated candidates with familial ties indicate that Indonesian politics has the short-term aim of winning elections and securing seats rather than acting in favor of long-term sustainable regeneration.

Implications of dynasty politics/clientelism create substantial problems because they obstruct the democratic internal mechanism of the party through the cooptation of the interests of elite leaders. Parties often do not have a benchmark to evaluate the quality and competence of their candidates in their undemocratic admission process. The final decision is made by the party head or a small group of political elites in closed processes that lead to the obstruction of democratic internal political processes. In the closed processes of decision making, power is highly concentrated in a small group of individuals (oligarchy) and usually involves money politics. The individuals who control the money and funding possess substantial power, have the authority to control and dictate the terms of the nomination, and are generally the source of funding for finance political campaigns. When the candidates win the election, they must pay back the money their campaign received.

During the 2019 election, many businessmen, successful entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists were candidates. As Chart 1 demonstrated, most elected MPs are professionals (53%). Advances in democracy in Indonesia have stalled because of the

negative effect of the power of capital and oligarchy. Oligarchs work systematically to influence public policy such that it benefits their interests.

Based on the analyses in this paper, I conclude that descriptive/statistical representation has no correlation with substantive representation. Issues related to the meaning of representation; political parties' nomination of women and internal democracy; and patronage, dynasty politics, and oligarchy lead to the entrapment of women MPs into providing shallow, symbolic representation, debilitating the progress to achieve substantive representation of women in politics.

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